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CCFYRIGHT DEPOSE 



THIS VOLUME 

TDK I-ROI'KRTY OI' Tlllv 

LIBEARY OF CO^M^tEESS 

WASHINGTON. 

IS LENT TO 

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

KOR rPK AT 

THE PEACE CONFERENCE 



By C. Snouck Hurgronje 

The Holy War, Made in Germany 

Mohammedanism 

The Revolt in Arabia 



The 
Revolt in Arabia 



By 

Dr. C. Snouck Hurgronje 

Professor of the Arabic Language in the University of 

Leidea; Councillor to the Dutch Ministry 

of the Colonies, etc. 



With a Foreword by 
Richard J. H. Gottheil 

Columbia University, New York 



G. P. Putnam's Sons 

New York and London 

trbe ftnfcFierbocFter press 

1917 



Copyright, 191 7 

BY 

C SNOUCE HURGRONJE 



FEB 20 19(7 



Ube ftnicltecbocfter pxest, tKcvf Kork 



IG1,A455G06 



FOREWORD 

A LL those interested in Mohammedan 
^^ affairs were much surprised to learn, 
through a despatch from Cairo on Jtme 
22, 19 1 6, that the Emir of Mecca had re- 
volted from Turkish overlordship. Much 
speculation was indulged in regarding 
the causes for such an uprising and its 
probable or possible outcome; for there 
are few parts of the habitable globe about 
which the ordinary student of inter- 
national affairs knows so little as he does 
about Arabia. Life there has remained in 
much of its mediaeval primitiveness; 
and even scholars who are specially 
concerned about Mohammedanism, and 
about the several hundred millions of its 
devotees, are little better situated in 



iv Foreword 

receiving accurate information of that 
which is occurring in the "Holy Land" 
of Arabia. 

No one living knows its history better 
than does Professor Snouck Hurgronje 
of the University of Leiden. To his vast 
knowledge upon all subjects connected 
with Mohammedanism and gained from 
an extensive reading of its literatiu'e, he 
has added personal observation during 
the year that he spent in Mecca and 
Jiddah. He has been able to get an in- 
sight into the various questions involved 
in its tangled history at the present day, 
and to learn at first hand of the parties 
which are rivals for leadership there. In 
the Dutch newspaper Nieuwe Rotter- 
damsche Courant, July 14, 191 6, Professor 
Snouck Hurgronje gave a lucid expla- 
nation of the situation created as he saw 
it, by the proclamation of the Emir. 
The following pages contain a translation 



Foreword v 

of these articles. I have added, as an 
appendix, the official proclamation of the 
Shereef to the whole Moslem world as it 
appeared translated into English in The 
Near East for August 25, 1916. 

Since these articles were published in 
Holland we have heard very Httle as to 
what is happening in and aroimd Mecca. 
News has come that an attempt at admin- 
istrative reconstruction has been made at 
Jiddah; that the new Shereef has appoint- 
ed a special agent at Cairo in the person 
of Omar Bey al-Faruki; and that the 
new government has decided to publish 
a weekly paper called Elkihlah, which is 
to be edited by Fuad Effendi Khatib 
of Gordon College, Assuan. What is of 
greater importance is the alleged assist- 
ance offered to the Emir Husain by the 
Emir Abd al-Aziz ibn Sa'ud, the head of 
the Wahhabites in the Nejd — the district 
east of Medinah — and by the Zaidite Im- 



vi Foreword 

am Yahyah in the Yemen against the 
Turkish troops stationed there. 

Richard Gottheil. 

Dec. 23, 1916. 
Coltimbia University. 



CONTENTS 



PAGE 



Foreword iii 

I 

The Shereefate of Mecca . . i 

II 

The Shereefate of Mecca {Continued) i6 

III 
Shereef and Caliph .... 29 

Note 41 

APPENDIX 
Proclamation of the Shereef of Mecca 43 



THE REVOLT IN ARABIA 



THE SHEREEFATE OF MECCA 

HOW the public insists upon making 
a snap judgment on the signifi- 
cance of passing events is shown by the 
haste with which speculations are given 
out, speculations that are purely hypo- 
thetical because the truth of the reports 
that reach us can, as yet, be verified 
only approximately. 

According to a Reuter despatch, the 
Great Shereef of Mecca has revolted 
against Turkish authority and, at the 
head of his Arabs, has succeeded in forc- 
ing the capitulation of the garrisons of 



2 The Revolt in Arabia 

Mecca, Jidda, Ta' if, and Medina, and 
has seriously hampered the movements 
of Turkish troops, menacing to him, by 
the destruction of a section of the railroad 
from Medina to the north. Wolff's 
Bureau, on the other hand, spreads a 
report of the "Milli Agency" — the Turk- 
ish National Agency — that a troop of 
Arabs, to whom robbery was no unac- 
customed calling, had been persuaded by 
their captain, he being instigated by 
English marines, to bombard Mecca, 
that the Turkish troops had, however, 
speedily restored order, and that the 
raiders themselves, when it was proven 
that their leader had been seduced by 
English money to act thus basely, had 
delivered the miscreant to the Turkish 
authorities. 

If the German-Turkish statement be 
correct, the occurrence was insignificant 
and not deserving attention. If Reuter 



The Revolt in Arabia 3 

be right in the main point, then it is well 
worth while to consider what may be 
the possible consequences of the Arab 
movement. 

In either case, to comprehend the mat- 
ter rightly, the political significance of 
the Shereefate of Mecca should be under- 
stood and the reading public should have 
a clearer idea of what the title "Grand 
Shereef of Mecca" covers than is pos- 
sessed by the majority. 

Mecca, the birth-place of the Prophet 
Mohammed, was not the centre from 
which he extended his sovereignty over a 
great part of Arabia. The capital of the 
realm founded by him was Medina, situ- 
ated a ten-day caravan journey to the 
north. Moreover, when, about twenty 
years after his first appearance as Allah's 
messenger, Mohammed conquered Mecca, 
he did not think of transferring the seat 
of government thither. He had his own 



4 The Revolt in Arabia 

good reasons for this, which we can pass 
over here. Still weightier were the rea- 
sons that influenced his successors in the 
administration of the theocracy of Islam 
from such a step. Mecca was far too 
remote from the then existing centres of 
civilisation to be a convenient vantage 
point for the world conquest considered 
by Islam as its appointed task, and as a 
capital from which to administer the 
empire which the first Caliphs were able 
to establish by force of arms. Even 
Medina seemed unsuited for the purpose, 
permanently. Then, when the Persian 
Empire, Syria, Egypt, North Africa, and 
Spain were subjected to Islam, Arabia, re- 
garded politically, became a remote terri- 
tory with a steadily decreasing significance. 
The residence of the Caliphs was re- 
moved first to Damascus, later to Bagdad, 
where they remained established for five 
centuries — down to 1250 A.D. 



The Revolt in Arabia 5 

Still the Arabian peninsiila, arid though 
it is in the main, retained its prestige in 
the Moslem world, not only as the father- 
land of the conquerors, but also as the 
Holy Land of Islam. Mecca might be 
ill adapted for a political capital, but 
it was, in the eyes of the faithful, the 
earth's centre, where the first human 
pair had walked, where Abraham had 
founded the first House of God, theKaba, 
where every normal Mohammedan was 
bound to go once in his life to take part 
in the religious festival annually cele- 
brated there. 

While Mecca had already long been a 
religious centre for the heathen Arabians, 
after Mohammed's death Medina was 
classed with it as a spot where the foim- 
dations of Moslem theocracy were laid, 
where the Prophet had built his first 
mosque, and where he was buried. The 
lieutenants of the Caliphs in West Arabia 



6 The Revolt in Arabia 

(the Hijaz), with Medina as the first, 
Mecca as the second, capital, thus had the 
chief sanctuaries of Islam entrusted to 
their care, and they were bound to provide 
for the preservation of order at the 
enormous international gatherings for 
which the two holy cities had furnished 
a stage every year since Mohammed's 
death. 

Truly, the task was no easy one. The 
inhabitants of Mecca and Medina were, 
usually, at odds, and unanimous only in 
obstinacy and insubordination. The 
nomads of the intervening district con- 
tinued to be, under Islam, the anarchists 
that they had been from time immemorial. 
Only a very strong hand could bridle the 
disorders native to the Holy Land. And 
a strong hand had always been lacking. 

Very soon after its rise, the great empire 
of Islam fell asunder and the continuous 
contests between the state and statelets 



The Revolt in Arabia 7 

into which it dissolved made the central 
authority of the Caliph a mere fiction, 
incapable of efficient exercise of power. 
Even the states, prominent from their 
position and thus better situated to 
maintain order in the Holy Land, as it 
was their interest to do, could not spare 
the military force essential for the gov- 
ernor of the Hijaz (West Arabia). Thus 
the holiest, the least productive, and most 
difficult-to-rule portion of the Moslem 
Empire was practically given over to 
confusion as its natural vital element, 
and the more vigorous Mohammedan 
countries limited themselves to the pro- 
tection of the pilgrim caravans which 
set out from their realms for Arabia, and 
of such of their own subjects as had 
settled there. 

Out of the chaos in West Arabia, re- 
sulting from the disintegration of the 
Islamic Empire, was bom the Shereefate 



8 The Revolt in Arabia 

of Mecca. From the extraordinarily nu- 
merous posterity of Mohammed, issue 
of the union of his daughter Fatima with 
his nephew AH, many remained settled 
in Arabia as owners of date gardens, as 
robber knights at the head of Bedouin 
clans, or as speculators in the gradually 
increasing superstitious adoration of the 
Mohammedans for the Prophet's blood. 
Outside of Arabia, the descendants of Ali 
participated in political revolutions on 
greater or lesser scale, or had their hands 
filled by the governors of the Moslem 
lands. Their short-sighted avarice and 
their common lack of political talent, 
however, hindered them from carrying 
any important project to completion. 
Any success which they achieved was 
always transient. The universal con- 
dition of things in Arabia afforded the 
opportunity of turning a portion of the 
Holy Province into a personal domain. 



The Revolt in Arabia 9 

In about 1000 a.d., the heads of certain 
families among the descendants of All 
began to make themselves powerful in 
the Hijaz and held their groimd. 
From 1200 A.D. to the present time, one 
line of these children of AH, that of 
Katada, has succeeded in maintaining 
supremacy in Mecca. 

The names sharif — anglicized as shereef 
— that is "The Noble," and say y id signi- 
fying "Seigneur" or "Lord," have be- 
come, little by little, titles of nobility 
throughout the entire Mohammedan 
world, especially among the posterity of 
the Prophet. The head of the reigning 
family in Mecca is "The Shereef of 
Mecca" par excellence, and the people 
call him Sayyidana, that is "Our Master" 
(or Our Lord). How far the realm of 
these Shereef s was extended beyond Mecca 
depended, as long as the petty dynasties 
existed, entirely on the chances of 



10 The Revolt in Arabia 

circumstance; the more that confusion 
reigned in the surrounding Mohammedan 
realms and the greater the energy mani- 
fested by the ruling head of the family, 
the greater the portion of the Hijaz that 
came under his authority. The reverse 
was equally true. The defects of the 
most respected race of Islam were, to a 
great extent, the peculiar characteristics 
of the Mecca branch. They were in- 
capable of carrying out any great under- 
taking. 

The pilgrims, except when escorted 
by an imposing military force, were piti- 
lessly stripped of their every possession 
by the Shereef and his satellites. Like 
the Bedouins through whose territory 
the hajjis or pilgrims had to pass, who 
counted all money and property as 
God -given booty, the Shereefs con- 
sidered themselves justified in making 
Allah's guests at Mecca submit to every 



The Revolt in Arabia ii 

kind of bleeding, and the latter had no 
remedy. 

Further, there were among the members 
of the noble race one quarrel after another 
about their heritage, so that it was almost 
the normal state of affairs for one head 
of two rival branches of the family to fill 
the Shereefate while the other besieged 
Mecca or rendered the roads thither 
unsafe. The stable population of Mecca 
were sacrificed to this struggle for mastery; 
the blessings of peace were an imknown 
luxury to them. 

When the Hijaz was still actually 
governed from the political centre of 
Islam, Medina was the appointed capital. 
For an independent local principality, 
such as the Shereefate, Mecca had the 
advantage of not being so accessible to 
the military forces of powers that might 
trouble themselves about the Hijaz. 
Only occasionally could the Shereefs of 



12 The Revolt in Arabia 

Mecca control Medina at the same time, 
as the intervening distance was too great 
for the transportation facilities of the 
coimtry. The alpine city Ta'if, two or 
three days' journey east of Mecca, where 
many people from Mecca resorted for 
the summer, and the port Jidda, one 
to two days' journey to the west, ordi- 
narily fell under the Shereef. Several 
smaller ports were also included under 
his rule. The connection with the inte- 
rior, mainly inhabited by nomadic tribes, 
varied according to the personal relations 
of the Shereef with the head of the Be- 
douin clan. 

The Shereefate of Mecca differed from 
most of the states and principalities into 
which the great Islam Empire was divided, 
because it had not been developed gradu- 
ally from a governorship to a condition of 
greater independence, but was bom, spon- 
taneously, during a period of confusion. 



The Revolt in Arabia 13 

At Bagdad, as well as in other neigh- 
bouring capitals, people had accepted the 
change as ^.fait accompli. The Shereefate 
was neither expressly recognised nor 
expressly objected to as unlawful. Its 
century-long existence attained, moreover, 
a sort of virtual legitimacy through its 
acceptance by many Moslem tribes, who 
were represented in the Holy City by 
the annual deputations of pilgrims. 
These visitors were constantly exposed 
to ill treatment on the part of the 
Shereef. Yet, in spite of that, they 
held to a belief that domination over 
the Holy City belonged rightfully to 
a branch of the Holy Family. The 
fact was simply accepted as irrefut- 
able. 

The chief Islam powers have always 
attached a certain reservation to their 
tacit recognition of the Shereefs of Mecca 
which the latter have found themselves 



14 The Revolt in Arabia 

forced to accept. He was never an inde- 
pendent ruler and, in the long run, had 
to recognise the suzerainty of the protect- 
ing states. 



II 

THE SHEREEFATE OF MECCA — Continued 

] T was to these accidents of origin that 

the Shereefate of Mecca owed its 

peculiar standing. Its status was not a 

little enhanced by the unique significance 

of the city of Mecca for the Mohammedan 

world at large. From the tenth century, 

no one of the foremost Islam princes 

possessed the machinery to keep West 

Arabia under an administration even 

approximately orderly. On two points 

they were alike determined — first, to have 

their names introduced into the official 

prayers at the official ceremonies of 

Mecca, each desiring to take precedence 

of the others; second, that their deputies 

at the annual festivals should take rank 
15 



1 6 The Revolt in Arabia 

in accordance with their pretensions. In 
the prayers, the name of the CaHph was 
given first place, without question, even 
after his power had become a phantom. 
The descendants of the Prophet, wielding 
authority at Mecca from about the year 
1000 to 1200 A.D., managed the required 
homage with a certain impartiality. At 
their command, there were prayers, now 
for the official Caliph at Bagdad and 
again for the heretical opposition Caliph 
in Egypt, according to the puissance 
manifested or the bribes offered by the 
one or the other. The Shereef family, 
ruling at Mecca from about 1200 a.d. to 
the present time, were soon freed from 
the difficulty of choice when an end was 
made of the Fatimide Caliphate in Egypt 
and when the Mongol storm swept away 
that of Bagdad in 1258. In the centuries 
following these events, the Sultans alone 
were mentioned in the prayers. And it 



The Revolt in Arabia 17 

was thus, in the prayers, that there was 
the first formal expression of the relation 
between the Shereefate and the chief 
power of Islam. 

Egypt long held an imcontested posi- 
tion so that it is correct to speak of a pro- 
tectorate exercised by her Sidtans over 
the territory of West Arabia from the 
thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries. 
The Hijaz (West Arabia) was dependent 
on the Nile-land for the importation of 
foodstuffs and other necessities. The 
Mameliike Sultans permitted the con- 
tinuance of the Shereefate and did not 
interfere in the endless petty wars of 
succession fought by the claimants to 
the office. When it became necessary, 
it cost the Sultans little exertion to turn 
the scale in some of these contests with 
the help of a detachment of regular 
troops, and to enforce obedience. It 
was always an unequal strife between 



1 8 The Revolt in Arabia 

the trained soldiers of a great Moslem 
power and the Shereef's little force, con- 
sisting as it did, of a few himdred slaves, 
the same number of mercenaries, and 
the timely aid of a few Bedouin clans. 
Domestic dissension, moreover, always 
assured the punitory leader of the coope- 
ration of one party within the disturbed 
territory. 

When Egypt was conquered in 151 7 
by Sultan Selim, Turkey, automatically, 
took over the protectorate of the Holy 
Land. The Turkish Sultans styled them- 
selves, with unassuming pride, "the serv- 
ants" of both holy cities. At the same 
time, their garrison in Mecca was an 
outward and visible sign that they did not 
intend to share the service with anyone. 
From that epoch on, their names im- 
mediately preceded that of the Grand 
Shereef in the official prayers. Later, 
the significance of the honour was en- 



The Revolt in Arabia 19 

hanced by the addition of the title of 
Caliph assumed by the Turkish Sultans 
as sign and seal of their unrivalled power 
in Islam. 

The Osmans made as little effort to re- 
form the hopelessly muddled administra- 
tion of the holy cities as their predecessors 
in the Protectorate had done. By that 
date, the Shereefate had obtained for 
more than three centuries, and no Mo- 
hammedan thought of questioning either 
the legality or the desirability of the 
institution. 

The administration methods of the 
Osmans were as little adapted for per- 
manent centralization as those of the 
earlier Mohammedan empire had been. 
The provinces speedily assimied the char- 
acter of feudal holdings, each possessing 
a large measure of independence. The 
Pashas of Cairo, of Damascus, of Bagdad, 
vied with each other for the first rank 



20 The Revolt in Arabia 

at Mecca. From this rivalry the Sher- 
eefate profited, just as the suzerains of 
the Holy Land had reaped advantage 
from the family disputes of the Shereefs. 
In the eighteenth century, the Shereefs 
were not troubled by the pressure of a 
heavy hand from without, but they were 
forced to depend on themselves, and their 
inadequate equipment was a source of 
danger to them when an unexpected op- 
ponent threatened to destroy their power. 
The Wahhabis of Central Arabia, roused 
by a puritanic zeal to protest against 
what they declared was the dishonour of 
Islam, launched out on a campaign of 
reform. This "holy war," directed, pri- 
marily, against the Turkish domination, 
succeeded in exciting a religious fervour 
throughout a great part of Arabia, 
similar to that awakened by Mohammed 
twelve centuries earlier, and, at the turn 
of the eighteenth Into the nineteenth 



The Revolt in Arabia 21 

centuries, these Wahhabis succeeded in 
obtaining the mastery of the Holy Cities 
and in forcing the Shereefs to recognise 
their authority. With infinite difficulty 
the Pasha of Egypt, Mohammed Ali, 
later the first Khedive, succeeded in ful- 
filling the mission entrusted to him by 
the Sultan of Turkey and in reconquering 
the Holy Land in his turn. 

The then Shereef was punished for his 
inefficiency in repeUing the Wahhabis 
from his realm, by banishment, together 
with several members of his family, while 
the head of another branch of his kinsfolk 
was appointed to his vacated post. At 
this crisis, too, there was no talk of 
abolition of the Shereefate. 

With the expulsion of the Wahhabis 
from the Hijaz in 1813, begins the latest 
historical phase of the Shereefate. The 
Protectorate exercised by the first Khed- 



22 The Revolt in Arabia 

ive of Egypt down to 1840, partly in 
cooperation with, partly in opposition 
to, Turkish authority, was completely 
effective and so, as the Sultan was regu- 
larly represented in the Holy Land by 
a governor sent from Constantinople, 
the good old tumultuous times did not 
return for this free dynasty. 

The imderstanding between the Sher- 
eefs and their protectors at Stamboul 
were, however, never cordial; the aspira- 
tions and interests of the two parties were 
too far asunder for that. The Sultans 
of Turkey considered the Shereefate as a 
necessary evil that prevented them from 
making the Hijaz into an ordinary 
wilayet or province. They stationed there 
mihtary and civil officials similar to those 
in other wilayets, but the functions of these 
subordinates were hampered by the im- 
restricted power of the Shereef. After 
the Wahhabi war, this ruler was selected 



The Revolt in Arabia 23 

by the suzerain and the rival kinsmen 
could no longer oust an incumbent of the 
hereditary office by force of arms. They 
were obliged to resort to the weapons of 
intrigue with the Sultan and the Sublime 
Porte. Still, even with this appearance 
of stable administration, it was not until 
1880 that the Shereef finally relinquished 
as fruitless all armed resistance to the 
Sultan's deputies. The theory had been 
that the Sultan was to be obeyed, but that 
his servants in the Hijaz were unfaithful 
and could not be accepted. At Constan- 
tinople, meanwhile, certain members of 
the Shereef's family were kept in a kind 
of honourable captivity, partly as hostages 
for the good faith of the reigning Shereef, 
partly to relieve him from the burden of 
having rivals in his vicinity, and also 
it was a convenience to have those rivals 
in readiness in case the Shereef proved 
imtrustworthy. 



24 The Revolt in Arabia 

The Turkish governors of the Hijaz 
had no easy task. An energetic Shereef 
would always be on the alert to reduce 
the governor's authority to the smallest 
measure. A weak Shereef might be sub- 
missive, but then he was powerless to 
control the ill-disposed elements in his 
family and make them innocuous, and 
often he would be sacrificed to the wiles 
of the opposition. Cooperation between 
the two authorities for the maintenance 
of peace was not dreamed of. The roads 
from Mecca to Medina, to Jidda, to 
Ta'if , were in a chronic state of insecur- 
ity, and it was not seldom that the ra- 
pacious Bedouins rejoiced in the secret 
support of the Shereef. 

The Shereef Aim, incumbent of the 
dignity from 1882 to 1905, was of the 
energetic type, but he was, at the same 
time, an avaricious tyrant, whose actions 
suggest Caesar's mad ambition. One 



The Revolt in Arabia 25 

governor after another had to yield, and 
had to sit in his shadow. Ahmed Ratab 
alone succeeded in holding on from 1892 
to Ann's death in 1905, by shutting his 
eyes to the Shereef's ill deeds and con- 
tenting himself with a share in the profits 
that accrued from the malfeasance in 
office. Ann's brother, Abdullah, then 
living in Constantinople, was appointed 
his successor but died before he began his 
journey to his native land. Then the 
Sultan appointed Shereef AH, a nephew 
of Aun, as "Amir of Mecca." Such 
was the title given to these princes by 
the Turkish chancery, out of respect 
for a possible sensitiveness on the subject. 
Both Shereef AH and the governor, 
Ahmed Ratib, succimibed when the great 
Turkish Revolution broke out in 1908. 
Ratib had to submit to financial extor- 
tions and to exile, while the deposed 
Shereef settled down in Cairo. His cousin 



26 The Revolt in Arabia 

Husein, son of Aun's brother Ali, took 
his place as Shereef. It soon became 
apparent that this Husein intended to 
profit by the turn of events to retrieve the 
reputation and status of the Shereefate. 

It is well known that Arabia has con- 
tributed her share to the many difficulties 
with which the Young-Turk Government 
has had to battle from its inception. 
Thus the latter found it advisable to let 
the Shereef, appointed as he was by the 
new regime, to go his own gait and Husein 
made ample use of his freedom. 

During the Turco-Italian War, Turkish 
occupation was in a disturbed condition, 
especially in the southern part of Arabia 
and the Tin-kish Government asked 
Shereef Husein for help in relieving the 
besieged Turkish garrison of Obha in the 
rebellious Asir territory. With an old- 
time Shereef-army, composed of slaves, 
mercenaries, and Bedouins, Husein un- 



The Revolt in Arabia 27 

dertook a campaign which did, possi- 
bly, help secure the safe retreat of the 
beleaguered Turkish garrison of Obha, 
but which also, undoubtedly, tempered 
the Shereef's sense of dependence on 
Turkish authority. 

The same National Turkish News 
Agency (Milli Agency) contradicted by 
Renter in regard to the revolt in Arabia, 
which it had reported as "a quickly 
suppressed uprising of roving robber 
bands in the pay of England" — tele- 
graphed later that Shereef Husein was 
deposed and that Shereef AH, appointed in 
his stead, had already set out for Mecca. 
Here the nattiral queries arise whether, 
by the "roving robber leader" of the 
first Milli report, was meant Shereef 
Husein himself, and whether the pro- 
posed journey of Shereef Ali will pass 
without incident. Whether the newly 



28 The Revolt in Arabia 

appointed Shereef , that is the man with 
whose aid the Turkish Government is to 
try to suppress, once for all, "robber raid- 
ing," is the same who was replaced by 
Husein, some time ago, is not made 
clear in the Milli-despatch, but it is very 
probable that it is. In that case, Shereef 
AH must have left Cairo before the war 
and betaken himself to Constantinople. 

Here we have a repetition of the old 
game of playing off one Shereef against 
another, just as it was played in the past. 
And the outcome will depend on which 
of the two can gather the greater force 
of "robber raiders" under his standard: 
Ali, supported by the Turks and their 
friends, or Husein, aided by their op- 
ponents. 

Assuredly either alternative proves the 
significance that a serious revolt against 
Turkish authority would have under 
present circumstances. 



Ill 



SHEREEF AND CALIPH 

A SSUMING that the "robber raiders'* 
of the Tiirkish-German despatch 
and the Shereef of Mecca, referred to in 
the Renter telegram are one and the 
same person, and that, accordingly, Sher- 
eef Husein, Emir of Mecca, has raised 
his standard against the Turkish domina- 
tion, then the question arises, **What 
does the Shereef mean by his op- 
position?" 

Various writers on Islam have com- 
mented on the impropriety, according to 
Mohammedan law itself, of the assump- 
tion of the title of "Caliph" by the 
Sultan of Turkey. It was, indeed, for 

more than nine centuries, regarded by 
29 



30 The Revolt in Arabia 

the Moslem world as obligatory for the 
Caliphs to be able to trace their descent 
from the Arabic line of Koreish, the line 
from which Mohammed sprang. The 
pretensions advanced by the Sultans 
since the sixteenth century have never 
been generally approved. That they did 
not excite any vehement open opposi- 
tion was partly owing to the imposing 
puissance of the Turkish Empire at the 
moment when the Sultans decorated 
themselves with the name, and partly to 
the circtimstance that the usurped dignity 
had no practical sequence. The Caliph 
added no patch of ground to the territory 
that the Sultan had conquered with the 
sword, and spiritual authority has never 
been ascribed to the Caliph by the Mos- 
lem congregations. With the assump- 
tion of the highest appellation that could 
be worn by a Moslem regent after Mo- 
hammed, these Sultans simply announced 



The Revolt in Arabia 31 

to all Moslem princes that none of them 
would be allowed to consider themselves 
his equal. 

Such Moslems as were under Turkish 
authority were not affected by the Cali- 
phate of their Sultan. The relation of 
subjects to their rulers in Mohammedan 
realms not subordinated to Turkey were 
even less affected; and least of all did 
the matter signify to those followers of 
Islam ruled by non-Mohammedans. 
These are numerous and have steadily 
increased during the last centuries. An 
effective Caliphate, however explained, 
presupposes the political luiity of all the 
faithful. 

The Caliph is the very personification 
of such unity and is, primarily, the leader 
of Islam's armies against the foes of the 
Faith, or he bears a name bereft of all 
significance. In international life there 
is no room for mediaeval structures, and 



32 The Revolt in Arabia 

Turkey can live in peace with other 
states, especially with those possessing 
Mohammedan subjects, only if Caliphate 
pretensions be honestly put aside, even 
though the title be maintained as a formal 
one. This was well imderstood by Turk- 
ish statesmen of later times, and they 
either banished the Caliphate idea in all 
their international discussions, or they 
permitted their European colleagues, who 
mistakenly regarded the Caliph as a sort 
of pope — a prince of the Church — to 
continue to entertain this false conception 
as it was harmless. 

Unlettered Mohammedans, who, ignor- 
ant of the modem point of view, went 
on assigning an important place to the 
Caliphate legend in their framework of 
the political system, were, however, often 
presented with panislamic visions in 
order to retain, fictitiously, at least, what 
had long vanished from real life. And 



The Revolt in Arabia 33 

these visions were often big with am- 
bition. 

How completely at odds the Caliphate 
idea is with modem international rela- 
tions appeared when the Turkish Gov- 
ernment, seduced by its aUiance with 
Germany, brought it to the fore, anew. 
The first outward and visible sign of the 
renaissance of the CaHphate was the 
declaration of the "Holy War," accom- 
panied by an appeal to all the Moham- 
medans in the world to participate therein, 
irrespective of the political authority 
they were bound to obey. Next came a 
series of official and officious publica- 
tions, all based on the hypothesis that 
the Turkish Sultan-Caliph is the man 
who, under all circumstances, controls the 
political policy of the Mohammedans. 

Taking all these points into considera- 
tion, it becomes hardly needful to reply 
to the question as to how the Shereef of 



34 The Revolt in Arabia 

Mecca might, perhaps, try to become a 
rival of the Sultan Mehmed Reshad as a 
pretender to the Caliphate. 

A Caliphate, no matter who holds the 
dignity, is wholly incompatible with mod- 
em political conditions. And this will 
be as true after the present war as it was 
before. Only as an empty title can it be 
tolerated at all. 

For the rest, it can be seen, from 
what we have already written about the 
history and the current condition of the 
Shereefate, that any lofty aspirations 
would be especially ill adapted for local 
principalities. The idea of a Caliphate of 
the Shereefs of Mecca has been venti- 
lated, more than once, by this or that 
European writer on Islam, but, in the 
Moslem world, it has never been 
broached, and no one of the Shereefs 
from the House of Katada — rulers in 
Mecca and in varying portions of West 



The Revolt in Arabia 35 

Arabia ever since the year 1200 A.D. — 
ever thought of such a thing. It is im- 
probable that even foreign influence 
could prevail on a Shereef of Mecca to 
attempt to gamble for the Caliphate. 
They all know too well how little chance 
of success there would be in such an 
attempt, and they feel themselves limited 
by tradition and by their resources to 
the Hijaz. 

Perhaps it is not superfluous to contro- 
vert another error into which many fall, 
— the opinion, namely, that the wresting 
of the Hijaz from Turkish domination 
would, automatically, end the Turkish 
Caliphate, since the Caliph bases his 
claim to the title partly on his protection 
of the Holy Cities. This opinion is sup- 
ported by neither Mohammedan law 
nor by Mohammedan history. Mecca 
and Medina have known periods when, 
for instance, they were in the hands of 



36 The Revolt in Arabia 

the unbeHeving Karmathians, when again 
they submitted to the heretical Fatimide- 
Caliphs, when all relations with the seat 
of the Caliphate were suspended, when 
the Wahhabis drove the Turks from the 
Holy Land; on none of these occasions 
did it occur to a single Moslem to ques- 
tion the right of the Caliph to his dignity. 
The Caliphate and the Holy Land have, 
more than once, existed independently 
of each other. 

Quite apart from high political aspira- 
tions, there are reasons enough which 
might have excited Husein to renounce 
obedience to the Turk. It is well known 
that the relations between Sultan-Caliph 
and the Shereef have been perfunctory 
and never cordial. The Shereef s have 
invariably felt the protectorate as an 
oppressive bond, and the Turks have 
never been able to appeal to the popula- 
tion in the name of the blessings that 



The Revolt in Arabia 37 

they, the conquerors, have bestowed on 
the land. They have given nothing and 
have never been in a position even to 
assure the safety of the roads leading to 
the Holy Cities during the few weeks of 
the pilgrimage. In Arabia as little as 
elsewhere have the Turks tried to affiliate 
with the people. They are unpopular 
in the highest degree. 

The Committee of Union and Progress, 
in whose hands Turkey has been since 
1908, has by no means made itself idolised 
by the Meccanese and their hereditary 
princes. Visitors to Stamboul from Mec- 
ca, since 1908, came away scandalized 
at the methods and ideals of Young Tur- 
key. All Mecca subsists on the pilgrim- 
ages, and the interest of all is centred on 
the gains accruing to them from the 
hajji (pilgrim) , just as that of an agricul- 
tural people is intent upon the prospects 
of the harvest. The Committee that 



38 The Revolt in Arabia 

inscribed Liberty, Equality, and Frater- 
nity on their standards and then pro- 
ceeded to adopt despotic methods in 
administration, equivalent to those of 
Abdul Hamid, is regarded at Mecca as 
the cause of Turkey's participation in the 
war of which the palpable result for the 
Holy Cities was the absence of pilgrims 
and the restriction of the importation 
of foodstuffs. Even the people of West 
Arabia, who had heartily accepted 
Turkish sovereignty as such, now curse 
the present Turkish regime. No wonder 
that they were ready to appeal to a power 
that was foe to Turkey's ally, Germany! 
The latest Reuter telegram, according 
to which trade at Jidda, is again on a 
normal basis, indicates in its informa- 
tion one of the main causes of the 
Anti-Turkish movement. 

In the Great War, the Shereefate of 
Mecca cannot possibly take part. The 



The Revolt in Arabia 39 

forces at its disposal are nothing more 
than a bodyguard, a few mercenaries, 
and the contribution made by some 
Bedouin tribes, difficult to hold together, 
undisciplined, imtrained. The popula- 
tion of the holy cities furnishes no ele- 
ments for the formation of a military 
force, and in that population, Shereef 
AH, whom the Turks now wish to use, 
will assuredly find some adherents. Ara- 
bia is still, as it was of yore, hopelessly 
divided by conflicting interests and by 
century-long feuds. It is not ready for 
great undertakings. But, for the moment, 
a revolt in West Arabia against Turkey, 
under the lead of the Great Shereef and 
aided by England, can cause serious 
trouble to the Turkish Government, and 
all the more, because it is at Mecca, 
familiar to, and cherished by, the entire 
Mohammedan world. Such a campaign, 
well prepared and ably conducted, would 



40 The Revolt in Arabia 

be a master-stroke in opposition to the 
attempt, made by Young Turkey under 
German protection, to excite the mediaeval 
fanaticism of Islam against other religious 
sects and to use it as an incentive to strife. 
However that may be, those who abomi- 
nate playing with the fire of religious 
hate, a measure to which the Young 
Turks, in the main non-religious, have al- 
lowed themselves, to be persuaded, have 
no reason to regret the Arabian uprising. 
All that can tend to making an end of 
the tinworthy noisy talk of "Caliphate" 
and "Holy War" may be regarded as 
commanding respect. 



NOTE 

The following translation of the Pro- 
clamation appeared in The Near East: 

Since writing his monograph, Professor Hur- 
gronje has had reason to doubt his surmise as 
to the identity of the new Grand Shereef sent 
by the Turkish government to Medina. Prob- 
ably it is not the Ali who succeeded to his uncle 
Aun and settled in Egypt after his demission. 

The proclamation is added as interesting in 
connection with Professor Hurgronje's own 
articles. He would have preferred to give the 
Turkish proclamation as well as this, had this 
been possible. 



41 



APPENDIX 

PROCLAMATION OF THE SHEREEF OF MECCA 

"In the name of God, the Merciful, the 
Compassionate . ' ' 

This is our general proclamation to all our 
Moslem brothers. 

"O God, judge between us and our people 
in truth; Thou art the Judge." 

The world knoweth that the first of all 
Moslem princes and rulers to acknowledge 
the Turkish Government were the Emirs of 
Mecca the Blessed. This they did to bind 
together and make strong the brotherhood of 
Islam, for they saw the Sultans of the House 
of Osman (may the dust of their tombs be 
blessed, and may they dwell in Paradise!), 
how they were upright, and how they carried 
out all the commandments and'ordinances of 
the Faith and of the Prophet (prayers be 
upon him!) perfectly. Therefore they were 
obedient to them at all times. 

For a token of this, remember how in A.H. 
1322 I with my Arabs helped them against 

43 



44 Appendix 

the Arabs, to save Ebhah from those who 
were besieging it, and to preserve the name 
of the Government in honour ; and remember 
how again in the next year I helped them 
with my armies, which I entrusted to one of 
my sons; for in truth we were one with the 
Government until the Committee of Union 
and Progress rose up, and strengthened 
itself, and laid its hands on power. Con- 
sider how since then ruin has overtaken the 
State, and its possessions have been torn 
from it, and its place in the world has been 
lost, until now it has been drawn into this 
last and most fatal war. 

All this they have done, being led away by 
shameful appetites, which are not for me to 
set forth, but which are public and a cause 
for sorrow to the Moslems of the whole 
world, who have seen this greatest and most 
noble Moslem Power broken in pieces and 
led down to ruin and utter destruction. Our 
lament is also for so many of its subjects, 
Moslems and others alike, whose lives have 
been sacrificed without any fault of their own. 
Some have been treacherously put to death, 
others cruelly driven from their homes, as 
though the calamities of war were not enough. 



Appendix 45 

Of these calamities the heaviest share has 
fallen upon the Holy Land. The poor, and 
even families of substance, have been made 
to sell their doors and windows, yea, even 
the wooden frames of their houses, for bread, 
after they had lost their furniture and all 
their goods. Not even so was the lust of the 
Union and Progress fulfilled. They laid 
bare all the measure of their wicked design, 
and broke the only bond that endured be- 
tween them and the true followers of Islam. 
They departed from their obedience to the 
precepts of the Book. 

With the connivance of the Grand Vizier 
of the Ottoman Empire, the Sheikh-el- 
Islam, the Ulema, the Ministers, and the 
Notables, one of their papers called the 
Ijtihad published in Constantinople un- 
worthy things about the Prophet (The 
Prayer and Peace of God be upon him !) and 
spoke evil of him (God forbid!). Then the 
Union and Progress rejected God's word, 
"A man shall have twice a woman's share," 
and made them equal. They went further 
and removed one of the five comer-stones of 
the Faith, even the Fast in Ramadan, by 
causing the soldiers in garrison in Mecca, 



46 Appendix 

Medina, and Damascus to break their fast 
for new and foolish reasons, taking no account 
of the ordinance of God saying, "Those of 
you who are sick or on a journey. ..." 
Yea, they went further. They made weak 
the person of the Sultan, and robbed him of 
his honour, forbidding him to choose for him- 
self the chief of his personal Cabinet. Other 
like things did they to sap the foundation 
of the Khalifate. 

For this it had been clearly our part and 
our necessary duty to separate ourselves 
from them and renounce them and their 
obedience. Yet we would not believe their 
wickedness, and tried to think that they 
were the imaginings of evil-doers to make a 
division between us and the Government. 
We bore with them until it was apparent to 
all men that the rulers of Turkey were Enver 
Pasha, Jemal Pasha, and Tallaat Bey, who 
were doing whatsoever they pleased. They 
made their guilt manifest when they wrote 
to the Judge of the Sacred Court in Mecca 
traducing the verses in the Surah of the Cow, 
and laying upon him to reject the evidence 
of believers outside the Court and to con- 
sider only the deeds and contracts engrossed 



Appendix 47 

within the Court. They also showed their 
guilt when they hanged in one day twenty- 
one of the most honourable and enlightened 
of the Moslems, among them Emir Omar el 
Jazairi, Emir Arif el Shahabi, Shefik Bey 
Moajryad, Shukri Bey el Ash, Abdel Wahab, 
Tewfik el Bassat, Abdel Hamid el Zahrawi, 
Abdel Ghani el Areisi, and their learned com- 
rades. To destroy so many, even of cattle, 
at one time would be hard for men void of 
all natural affection or mercy. And if we 
suppose they had some excuse for this evil 
deed, by what right did they carry away to 
strange countries the innocent and most 
miserable families of those ill-fated men? 
Children, old men, and delicate women bereft 
of their natural protectors were subjected 
in exile to all foul usage and even to tortures, 
as though the woes they had already suffered 
were not chastisement enough. Did not 
God say: "No punishment shall be inflicted 
on anyone for the sins of another? . . ." 
Let us suppose they found for themselves 
some reason for ill-treating the harmless 
families of their victims; why then did they 
rob them of their properties and possessions, 
which alone remained to keep them from 



48 Appendix 

death by famine? And if we suppose that 
they had also some excuse for this evil deed, 
how shall we find pardon for them for their 
shattering of the tomb of our most righteous 
and upright Lord and Brother, El Sayed el 
Shereef Abdel Kader el Jezairi el Hassani, 
whose bones they have polluted and whose 
dust they have scattered abroad? 

We leave the judgment of these misdeeds, 
which we have touched upon so briefly, to 
the world in general and to Moslems in par- 
ticular. What stronger proof can we desire 
of the faithlessness of their inmost hearts to 
the Religion, and of their feelings towards the 
Arabs, than their bombardment of that 
ancient House, which God has chosen for 
His House, saying, "Keep my House pure 
for all who come to it," — a House so 
venerated by all Moslems? From their fort 
of Jyad, when the revolt began, they shelled 
it. The first shot struck a yard and a-half 
above the Black Stone. The second fell 
three yards short of it, so that the flame 
leapt up and took hold upon the Kiswa. 
Which, when they saw, the thousands and 
thousands of Moslems first raised a lament- 
able cry, running to and fro, and then shouted 



Appendix 49 

in fierce anger and rushed to save it. They 
had to burst open the door and mount upon 
the roof before they could quench the flames. 
Yet a third shell fell upon the Tomb of 
Abraham, and other shells fell in and about 
the precincts, which they made a target for 
their guns, kilHng every day three or four who 
were at prayer within the Mosque, till they 
prevented the people coming near to worship. 
This will show how they despised His House 
and denied it the honour given it by believers. 

We leave all this to the Moslem world for 
judgment. 

Yes, we can leave the judgment to the Mos- 
lem world; but we may not leave our religion 
and our existence as a people to be a play- 
thing of the Unionists. God (Blessed be He !) 
has made open for us the attainment of free- 
dom and independence, and has shown us a 
way of victory to cut off the hand of the op- 
pressors, and to cast out their garrison from 
our midst. We have attained independence, 
an independence of the rest of the Ottoman 
Empire, which is still groaning under the 
tyranny of our enemy. Our independence is 
complete, absolute, not to be laid hands on 
by any foreign influence or aggression, and 



50 Appendix 

our aim is the preservation of Islam and the 
uplifting of its standard in the world. We 
fortify ourselves on the noble religion which 
is our only guide and advocate in the prin- 
ciples of administration and justice. We are 
ready to accept all things in harmony with 
the Faith and all that leads to the Mountain 
of Islam, and in particular to uplift the mind 
and the spirit of all classes of the people in 
so far as we have strength and ability. 

This is what we have done according to 
the dictates of our religion, and on our part 
we trust that our brethren in all parts of the 
world will each do his duty also, as is incum- 
bent upon him, that the bonds of brotherhood 
in Islam may be confirmed. 

We beseech the Lord of Lords, for the 
sake of the Prophet of Him who giveth all 
things, to grant us prosperity and to direct 
us in the right way for the welfare of the 
faith and of the faithful. 

We depend upon God the All-Powerful, 
whose defence is sufficient for us. 

Shereef and Emir of Mecca, 

HUSEIN. 

25 Shaaban, 1334. 



Jk Selection from the 
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A concise account of the main prob- 
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present state of Mohammedanism, — es- 
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